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Essays in the Economics of Crime 
and Discrimination 
Michael Mueller-Smith 
The United States and other Western countries stand 
out as global leaders in development and human rights 
(United Nations Development Programme 2014), yet some 
groups continue to be marginalized with limited access to 
the opportunities and institutions that make these countries 
exceptional. This dissertation focuses on two such popula-
tions, criminal defendants and sexual minorities, with the 
goal of documenting how legal and social systems shape 
individuals’ economic behavior and well-being. Chapter 1 
examines the impact of incarceration on criminal and labor 
market outcomes in Harris County, Texas. Chapter 2 doc-
uments patterns of concealment among men experiencing 
same-sex attraction in the United States and studies the costs 
and implications. Chapter 3 analyzes how legal recognition 
of same-sex unions impacts the labor market and fertility 
outcomes for gay and lesbian couples in Sweden. 
Chapter 1
The Criminal and Labor Market Impacts  
of Incarceration 
The United States currently has the highest incarceration 
rate in the world (Walmsley 2009), a consequence of three 
decades of dramatic growth in the prison population since 
the late 1970s (Carson 2013). Over this same time period 
governmental expenditures on police protection, judicial and 
legal systems, and corrections also surged (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics 1980; Kyckelhahn 2013). Recent estimates indicate 
that the annual U.S. correctional population included over 
7 million adults (Glaze and Herberman [2013]), and com-
bined federal, state, and local expenditures on justice-related 
programs topped $260 billion per year. Despite the reach and 
cost associated with these changes to criminal justice policy, 
causal evidence on how this use of incarceration has impacted 
the population remains scarce (see Donohue [2009]). 
This chapter investigates the impacts of incarceration 
using original data from Harris County, Texas. The new data 
are composed of over 2.6 million criminal court records 
accounting for 1.1 million unique defendants, capturing 
the universe of misdemeanor and felony criminal charges 
between 1980 and 2009 regardless of final conviction status. 
It is also linked to state prison and county jail administra-
tive data, unemployment insurance wage records, public 
assistance benefits, marriage and divorce records, and future 
criminal behavior. 
The research design leverages the random assignment of 
criminal defendants to courtrooms as a source of exogenous 
variation in both the extensive and intensive margins of 
incarceration. The courts are staffed by judges and pros-
ecutors who differ in their propensity to incarcerate. As a 
result, which courtroom a defendant is randomly assigned 
to strongly predicts whether he will be incarcerated and for 
how long. This increasingly popular identification strategy 
has been used in a number of applications where judges, 
case workers, or other types of program administrators are 
given discretion on how to respond to a randomly assigned 
caseload. 
The application considered in this chapter is moderately 
more complex than other potential uses of this research 
design. Sentencing takes on multiple dimensions (e.g., 
incarceration, fines, and drug treatment), and judges display 
nonmonotonic tendencies (e.g., a judge may incarcerate drug 
offenders at a relatively higher rate but property offenders 
at a relatively lower rate). Since failure to account for these 
features of the data can lead to violations of the exclusion 
restriction and monotonicity assumption, a new estimation 
procedure is developed. In this new approach, I relax the 
first-stage equation to allow the impact of court assignment 
on sentencing outcomes to flexibly respond to observed 
defendant characteristics. Because this can generate many 
instruments due to the curse of dimensionality, the least 
absolute selection and shrinkage operator (LASSO) is used 
in conjunction with cross validation as a data-driven tool 
to achieve disciplined dimension reduction without skew-
ing statistical testing. I then use this approach to construct 
instruments for each observed aspect of sentencing, not just 
incarceration, to control for court tendencies on nonfocal 
sentencing dimensions. 
The empirical findings in this chapter indicate that 
incarceration for marginal defendants is less attractive from 
a policy perspective than has been shown in prior work. I 
measure modest incapacitation effects while defendants are 
in jail or prison: felony defendants are 6 percentage points 
less likely to be charged with a new criminal offense while 
incarcerated. This benefit, however, is offset by increases 
in postrelease criminal behavior: each additional year that a 
felony defendant was incarcerated increases the probability 
of facing new charges postrelease by 5.6 percentage points 
per quarter. These results are particularly concerning because 
the incapacitation effect is disproportionately driven by mis-
demeanor charges, while the postrelease criminal behavior 
shows mainly increases in felony offenses. Partially driving 
this result is a pattern of former inmates being charged with 
new crime types. In particular, I find that former inmates 
are especially likely to commit more property (e.g., theft or 
burglary) and drug-related crimes after being released, even 
if these crimes were not their original offenses.
In contrast with prior work, I find strong evidence that 
incarceration has lasting negative effects on labor market 
outcomes after defendants have been released. I find that 
each additional year of incarceration reduces postrelease 
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employment by 3.6 percent points. Among felony defendants 
with stable precharge earnings incarcerated for one or more 
years, reemployment drops by at least 24 percent in the five 
years after being released. Misdemeanor defendants show 
a small increase in take-up of cash welfare payments, and 
felony defendants show increases in Food Stamps benefits, 
which provide further evidence of lasting economic hardship 
postrelease. 
The impacts of incarceration extend beyond recidivism 
and labor market outcomes. Incarceration appears to neg-
atively impact family formation and stability as measured 
through marriage and divorce activity. While incarcerated, 
young felony defendants exhibit significantly lower rates of 
marriage that are not compensated postrelease, indicating a 
net decline in marriage rather than a temporal shift. Further 
supporting this conclusion, I find that divorce rates among 
older felons increase while in prison and postrelease. 
Using these new estimates, I reevaluate the welfare 
impacts of incarceration. Because I cannot measure general 
deterrence effects in my research design, the cost-benefit 
exercise is partial in nature and only accounts for the admin-
istrative expenses, criminal behavior effects, and economic 
impacts associated with the defendant’s own outcomes. 
Using the most conservative estimates, I find that a one-year 
prison term for marginal defendants decreases social welfare 
by $56,200 to $66,800, of which negative impacts to eco-
nomic activity account for 41–48 percent of overall costs. In 
order for this sentence to be neutral in social welfare terms, 
a one-year prison term for a marginal (low-risk) offender 
would need to deter at least 0.4 rapes, 2.2 assaults, 2.5 rob-
beries, 62 larcenies, or 4.8 habitual drug users in the general 
population. 
Chapter 2
Discrimination with Concealable 
Characteristics: Evidence and Application to 
Sexual Orientation in the United States
Economic research on discrimination, both theoretical 
(Becker 1957) and empirical (e.g., Bertrand and Mullaina-
than [2004]; Charles and Guryan [2008]; Goldin and Rouse 
[2000]) has classically assumed that minority traits are per-
fectly observable. In the context of race and sex, which form 
the general foundation of existing research, such an assump-
tion is innocuous. In the second chapter, however, I propose 
a departure from this body of work through the consideration 
of an alternative class of traits: concealable characteristics. 
These traits are precisely defined by the fact that they are not 
publicly observable. Instead, agents make an active decision 
whether to disclose or conceal their minority status. 
The proposed departure has important implications 
from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. Given 
the option to conceal, individuals who self-identify their 
minority status represent the subset of the population for 
whom the benefits of disclosure outweigh the costs, which is 
a classic case of selection bias. A potential consequence of 
this bias, for example, could be that those likely to face the 
worst discrimination conceal their type and generate censor-
ing in the distribution of realized discrimination (i.e., what 
is actually measurable ex post in equilibrium). As a result, 
estimates based on self-reported status would underestimate 
the true magnitude of discrimination faced in the population. 
If we suppose that the researcher could measure innate 
preferences, selection bias could be avoided, but standard 
models that focus on wage penalties may fail to capture the 
nuanced implications of discrimination. The costs of discrim-
ination may be dispersed across multiple outlets (e.g., labor 
market penalties and mental health costs), and the relevant 
channel will uniquely depend on the individual’s conceal-
ment status. This stands in contrast to Becker [1957], who 
concludes that zero or minimal measured wage penalties is 
an indication that all or most minorities have found non- 
discriminating firms and avoided punishment. 
The specific application being considered in this chapter 
is innate sexual orientation, a concept that is theoretically 
distinct from self-identified sexual orientation. The former 
category measures an individual’s private sexual attraction, 
while the latter is the public presentation of one’s sexual 
orientation. 
Original empirical analysis illustrates how concealment 
potential shapes life-cycle outcomes using data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. The chapter 
leverages the fraternal birth order (FBO) hypothesis from 
developmental psychology as a proxy measure for innate 
sexual orientation in lieu of self-identified sexual orientation. 
The FBO hypothesis is the culmination of numerous stud-
ies that have consistently found that men with more older 
brothers are more likely to identify as homosexual or report 
same-sex attraction (see Blanchard [1997]). This proxy for 
innate sexual orientation is used in conjunction with varying 
degrees of juvenile exposure to local discrimination against 
the lesbian, gay, and bisexual community based on the 
respondent’s county of birth in the United States. Studying 
how these two sources of variation interact will allow the 
chapter to consider how life-cycle trajectories change in 
response to increasing motives to conceal, and whether early 
life exposure to antigay policies and attitudes has long-term 
implications past adolescence. 
My evidence documents patterns of concealment and its 
corresponding impact on individual outcomes. I find that 
men who were more likely to develop same-sex attraction 
yet born in more homophobic counties were significantly 
less likely to engage in same-sex cohabitation through age 
45 compared to similar men from less homophobic coun-
ties. Changes in identity investments (conservative gender 
ideology and religious adherence) conform with this pattern, 
and sizable penalties to mental health and educational attain-
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ment accrue to men from more homophobic backgrounds. 
Labor market outcomes, however, appear to generally be 
unaffected. I hypothesize that men who experience same-
sex attraction yet conceal it are compensated for this choice 
despite their diminished human capital. 
Chapter 3
Same-Sex Partnership for What? Evidence 
from Swedish Registers  
(coauthored with Lina Aldén, Lena Edlund, and  
Mats Hammerstedt)
The last chapter studies how individual and joint out-
comes evolve for same-sex couples after entering into a 
legalized recognized union in Sweden. In 1989, Denmark 
became the first country to legally recognize same-sex 
unions. Since then, some 31 countries have followed suit, the 
United States being the latest to legalize same-sex marriage 
nationwide. 
Despite growing demand, relatively little is known about 
the function of legal same-sex unions. What is it that legal 
status confers that cannot be achieved through private con-
tracts or actions such as cohabitation? Arguably, the same 
might be asked of the long-lived institution of opposite-sex 
marriage. 
But what holds for opposite-sex unions need not carry 
over to same-sex ones. For instance, the returns to marriage 
in the Beckerian framework rests on returns to specialization, 
and same-sex couples appear to specialize less (Jepsen and 
Jepsen 2002). Long-term commitment is another celebrated 
function of marriage that may or may not translate to same-
sex couples (Andersson et al. 2006). A potentially more 
thorny issue, however, is the so-called paternity presumption: 
the husband is the presumed father of children borne by the 
wife (Appleton 2006). Paternity presumption has until now 
been a universal feature of marriage and one that may even 
constitute its very core (Posner 1992). In fact, most same-
sex unions carve out paternity presumption, but even when 
included, its application is far from straightforward. This is 
so because of the strong rights accorded birth mothers. By 
default, the mother is the woman who gives birth. If a man 
in a same-sex partnership acknowledges paternity of a child 
born to an unmarried woman, will the child have three par-
ents? And if parental rights are at the heart of legal unions, 
then what is its relevance to all-male, and thus sterile, 
couples? 
This chapter highlights the practical implications for 
same-sex couples of greater access to legal rights formerly 
reserved for opposite-sex couples by studying an expansion 
of rights in Sweden. Starting in January 1995, same-sex cou-
ples could enter registered partnership, a contract that con-
ferred almost the same rights and obligations as opposite-sex 
marriage. However, paternity presumption was carved out 
in an innocuous-sounding exemption of rights extended to 
one sex only. It would be another eight years until same-sex 
partners gained the right to adopt jointly or as stepparents. 
The new adoption law was enacted in 2002 and took effect 
January 1, 2003. In this chapter, we analyze Swedish admin-
istrative data covering the period 1994–2007. 
Derived from Swedish registers, these data are high qual-
ity, have universal coverage, and allow us to follow individ-
uals. Using these administrative data, we identify and follow 
all individuals who entered into registered partnerships in 
1995–2006 (to allow for a post- and preunion year). For 
comparison, we include all who entered opposite-sex mar-
riage in the given period. The data contain detailed informa-
tion on earnings and children living in the household, which 
enables us to shed new light on how entry into partnership/
marriage affects labor market and parental outcomes. Our 
empirical strategy is to compare outcomes of earnings and 
presence of children before and after union entry, controlling 
for individual fixed effects so that the person serves as his or 
her own control group. 
By exploiting longitudinal data, we can avoid the prob-
lem of selection into partnership (or marriage) that arises 
in cross-sectional comparisons. However, the possibility 
that partnership/marriage entry is timed to coincide with 
other life changes remains. Milestones such as graduation or 
steady employment may both trigger marriage and presage 
earnings growth, resulting in an upward bias. On the other 
hand, a downward bias would result if partnership/marriage 
were timed to coincide with a downshift in labor market 
attachment (e.g., due to parenthood or retirement). There-
fore, our estimates provide a description of labor market and 
parenting responses to partnership/marriage entry but cannot 
isolate the causal effect of entry into partnership/marriage. 
Our most noteworthy finding pertains to parenthood. 
Following the 2002 adoption law giving those in a regis-
tered partnership the right to joint or step-parent adoption, 
we see both a noticeable increase in lesbian partnership and 
children living with lesbians in partnership. The net effect 
of union entry on presence of children, especially after the 
2002 reform, reveals similar effects of entry into legal union 
status for lesbian and opposite sex couples—couples with at 
least one woman. These findings highlight the importance of 
a legal framework for parental rights; indeed, it underscores 
the role of joint legal parenting for fertility decisions. 
Turning to earnings, we find a substantial decline in 
individual earnings for gay men (−12 percent), whereas for 
lesbian women the effect is small (−2 percent) and highly 
insignificant. As for couples’ earnings, the pronounced 
decline seen for gays is absent, suggesting a high degree of 
income buffering (or negative sorting). By contrast, among 
lesbians, the income reduction seen at the individual level 
is amplified once viewed at the couple level, suggestive of 
within-couple positively correlated labor market responses to 
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partnership entry. Within-couple earnings gaps change in a 
direction consistent with this interpretation. Among lesbians, 
there is a sizable (but statistically insignificant) reduction in 
the within-couple earnings gap, whereas among gays there is 
only a small and highly insignificant effect on the gap. 
As a point of reference, we also look at heterosexual 
couples and find effects of marriage largely in line with 
what has been documented in the literature: an increase in 
fertility, a decrease in women’s earnings, and an increase in 
the within-couple earnings gap. Men earn substantially more 
after marriage than before, but we find no evidence of a mar-
riage premium employing our within-individual comparison. 
Instead, we find a strong ramp up of earnings in the years 
leading up to marriage. Given the negative marriage pre-
mium for women and the absence of a positive premium for 
men, our finding that the combined earnings for the couple 
decline after marriage is perhaps unsurprising. 
Taken together, these findings paint a picture of same-sex 
registered partnership filling a different role for same-sex 
couples than marriage does for opposite sex couples, and the 
roles are different for gays and lesbians. Generally speaking, 
as evidenced by the earnings gap, specialization on union 
entry is much more pronounced among heterosexual couples 
and, if anything, higher among gays than lesbians. This is 
particularly noteworthy given the close to zero fertility effect 
among gays and similar fertility effects for women, whether 
in a same- or opposite-sex union. 
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